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THE JOINT ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE IN
AUTOMOBILE LAW
JOSEPH WEINTRAUB*

With the growth of accident litigation, at least one of the old fundamentals of the law appears to be tottering and, unless something occurs to check the present tendency of the courts, may collapse in favor
of new principles, peculiarly adapted to accident litigation. It has
long been axiomatic that a man shall not be forced to bear the consequences of the actions of another. There is a notable exception of
course, namely, the doctrine of respondeat superior, but in the absence of an agency relation, we are accustomed to the axiom in its
unadulterated form. It is this principle of law which is questioned,
perhaps unwittingly, by current judicial decisions.
A passenger in a vehicle is injured. His driver was negligent. So too
was the driver of the other vehicle, whom we may call, for convenience
sake, the third party. In an action by the passenger against the third
party, will the plaintiff be barred by his driver's negligence? And
assuming that the third party was innocent of blame, will the passenger, because of his driver's negligence, be compelled to compensate
the injured third party? And in an action by the passenger against
his driver, is there a status between the litigants which will absolve
the negligent driver from liability? If the ancient bulwark remain
firm, then, there being no agency relation, the passenger's position
should be unaffected by his driver's conduct. Such indeed is the
conclusion normally reached, but the harmony of result is disturbed
by the 'application of the so-called "joint enterprise doctrine", a
doctrine which is difficult to understand and therefore little understood.
It is the joint enterprise doctrine which is the subject of this article.
The writer will attempt (I) to set forth the historical ancestor of the
doctrine and the fate that befell it; (2) to relate the consequences
which flow from the application of the joint enterprise doctrine; (3) to
compare the several conceptions of the doctrine and the situations to
which they have been applied; and (4) to analyze the legal basis of
the doctrine.
It should be remembered that it is assumed throughout that the
passenger is personally free of culpable conduct. Attention will not
be paid to those cases which turn upon the passenger's active and
*Member of the New Jersey Bar.
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negligent interference with the operation of the vehicle or which spell
out the passenger's negligence from his failure to object to patent
mismanagement by the driver.' Such cases do not conflict with the
principle that one shall not answer for the conduct of another. Our
problem is, when and why will the negligence of the driver be imputed
to the passenger who is free of independent negligence and who is not
in fact the principal of the driver?
THE DOCTRINE

OF

THOROGOOD v. BRYAN

The forerunner of the joint enterprise doctrine was the English
case of Thorogood v. Bryan.2 In that case, which was a suit by the
representative of a passenger in an omnibus against a negligent third
party, it was held for the first time that a passenger was so identified
with the driver of the omnibus that the latter's contributory negligence would bar recovery.
So startling a doctrine could not survive judicial inquiry. In refusing to accept it, the New Jersey court wrote:
"But I have entirely failed to perceive how it is that the
passenger in a public conveyance becomes identified, in any
legal sense, with the driver of such conveyance. Such identification could result only in one way, that is, by considering such
driver the servant of the passenger. I can see no ground upon
which such a relationship is to be founded. In a practical point
of view, it certainly does not exist... To hold that the conductor of a street car, or of a railroad train is the agent of the
numerous passengers who may chance to be in it, would be a
pure fiction. In reality there is no such agency, and if we impute
it, and correctly apply legal principles, the passenger, on the
occurrence of an accident from the carelessness of the person in
charge of the vehicle in which he is being conveyed would be
without any remedy. It is obvious in a suit against the proprietor of the car in which he was a passenger, there could be no recovery if the driver or conductor of such car is to be regarded
as the servant of the passenger. And so on the same ground
each passenger would be liable to every person injured by the
carelessness of such driver or conductor, because, if the negligence
of such agent is to be attributed to the passenger for one purpose,
it would be entirely arbitrary to say that he is not to be affected
by it for other purposes."'
'The distinction between imputing the driver's negligence to the passenger
and the passenger's independent negligence is well brought out in: Franco v.
Vakares, 35 Ariz. 309. 277 Pac. 812 (1929); Winston's Adm'r v. City of Henderson, 179 KV.220, 200 S. W. 330 (1918); Alperdt v. Paige, 292 Pa. I, 14o Atl. 555
(1928). For duty of occupant, see (1922) 18 A.L.R. 3o9; (1926) 41 A.L. R. 767;
(1927) 47 A. L. R. 293.
28 C. B. i15 (1849).
'Bennett v. N. J. R. R. & Trans. Co., 36 N. J. L. 225, 227 (1873).
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Within a half-century the doctrine of the Thorogood case was laid
4
to rest as a fictitious extension ofthe principle of respondeatsuperior.
It became thoroughly settled both in England and in the United
States that a passenger in a common carrier or a passenger in a private
conveyance, being himself free of contributory negligence, could recover against a negligent third -party in spite of the concurring negligence of the driver. 4a The doctrine of the Thorogood case remains
5
only in Michigan, and there in but a limited form.
The joint enterprise doctrine represents a partial revival of the
Thorogood case. Both doctrines impute the negligence of the driver
to the passenger on some theory of agency, although, of course, in all
of these cases no actual agency exists, for if an actual agency did exist
there would be no need to resort to a theory other than respondeat
superior to obtain the desired result. But the joint enterprise doctrine is of more limited application than its predecessor in two respects:
first, no attempt has been made to apply the new conception to the
passenger for hire, and so long as the joint enterprise doctrine continues in its present form, no such attempt could succeed; and second,
the passenger in a private conveyance is affected by the new doctrine
only where certain elements are present, which elements will be detailed later.
4

Little v. Hackett, II6 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (I886); Shultz v. Old Colony

Street Ry., 193 Mass. 309, 79 N. E. 873 (1907),; Bennett v. N. J. R. R. & Trans.
Co., supra note 3; 1 SHEARMAN &REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (1913) § 66; (1924) It
BRIT.

RuL. CAS. 597. Wisconsin repudiated the doctrine in

1921.

Reiter v.

Grober, 173 Wis. 493, i8r N. W. 739 (19i21).
4
aAuthorities cited supra note 4; Broussard v. La. W. R. R., I4O La. 517, 73 So.
6o6 (1917); BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW (1927) 1137; HUDDY,
AUTomoBmEs (Curtis's 6th ed. 1922) §§ 679-80; Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 268, 685; 42
C. J. 1176.
5
Skaug v. Knappins, 241 Mich. 57, 216 N. W. 403 (1927). The doctrine is not

applied where the passenger is a passenger for hire, Galloway v. Detroit United
Ry., 168 Mich. 343, 134 N. W. 10 (1912), or a minor, Michelsen v. Wabash Ry.,
247 Mich. 383, 225 N. W. 481 (1929), or a servant of the driver, Robertson v.
United Fuel & Supply Co., 218 Mich. 271, 187 N. W. 3oo (1922), or a fellow
servant of the driver, City of Grand Rapids v. Croker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N. W.
221 (1922) (firemen). Nor has the doctrine ever been invoked to give the driver a
defence to an action by his passenger against him. Roy v. Kirn, 208 Mich. 571,
175 N. W. 475 (1919).
6That the basis of Thorogood v. Bryan is some theory of agency, see authorities
supra note 4. That the basis of the joint enterprise doctrine is some theory of
mutual agency, see Farthing v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N. W. 7o8 (1928);
Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N. B. 137 (1929); Robison v. OregonWashington R. R. & Nay. Co., 9o Ore. 49o, 176 Pac. 594 (1918); Hines v. Welch,
229 S. W. 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Director General v. P6nce's Adm'x, 135
Va. 329, 116 S. E. 351 (1923).
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CONSEQUENCES FLOWING FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE JOINT

ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE

As already indicated, it is assumed throughout that the passenger
is personally free of culpable conduct and that his driver is negligent.
If a joint enterprise exists, what effect has it upon (I) the rights of
the passenger against a negligent third party, (2) the liability of a
passenger to an innocent third party, and (3) the liability of the
driver to his passenger?
The great majority of the joint enterprise cases involve the first
problem, the right of the passenger against the negligent third party.
It was this situation in which the doctrine was first invoked. It is
universally conceded that if a joint enterprise exists the contributory
negligence of the driver will be imputed to the passenger to prevent
recovery against a negligent third party.7
The solution of the second problem, the liability of the passenger
to the innocent third party, is not necessarily controlled by the answer
to the first problem, for the joint enterprise doctrine, resting as it does
upon a fictional basis of mutual agency, may, like any other'fiction,
be denied its logical growth .where there is no policy to be served by
extending it. The law might sensibly say that when the passenger
entrusts his care to his fellow enterpriser he agrees to be bound by the
latter's conduct in an action against a negligent third party, but does
not contemplate that in addition he will be liable to those injured by
the driver. It is true, as the quotation from the New Jersey case
given above will indicate, that one of the compelling reasons for the
overthrow of the Thorogood case was the fear that that case would
logically make the passenger amenable to third parties; but on the
other hand it has been denied that the Thorogood case, even at the
most vigorous stage of its brief career, ever imposed an affirmative
liability upon the passenger. "' However, the joint enterprise doctrine
has been so frequently expressed in terms of agency 9, that the few
courts which have been confronted with the second problem have,
without any critical consideration, unanimously adopted the logical
deauction from the agency relation and held the passenger responsible to the innocent third party.'0
7BLASE[FIELD, op. cit. supra note 4a, at 1147; Mechem, The Contributory Negligence of Automobile Passengers (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 736, 747; (1929) 38
YALE L. J. 81o; (1907) 8 L. R. A. (N.s.) 597, 628; (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1055, 1077;
(1929) 62 A. L. R. 44o; (1924) 11 BRIT. Riu. CAS. 597, 620.

BReiter v. Grober, supra note 4. See Gilmore, Imputed Negligence (1921) 1
9
Supra note 6.
Wis. L. Rxv. 193, et seg.
0
' Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 516, 101 So. 49 (1924); Carpenter v.
Campbell Automobile Co., 159 Iowa 52, 14o N. W:225 (1913); Crawfordv. McE-
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Less harmonious, however, are the decisions on the third issue, the
liability of the driver to his passenger. There is at least an off-hand
plausibility in the contention that what excuses the negligent third
party should also excuse the negligent driver. This argument is
particularly forceful in jurisdictions where contribution is allowed
between joint tortfeasors, for there it is even more apparent that to
release the negligent third party and at the same time to hold the
negligent driver is to place the entire loss upon one whose conduct
was but a concurring force. Perhaps influenced by this consideration,
several courts have protected the driver,' and others have by inference entertained the same view. 12 On the other hand, it is argued
that even the true partnership relation has never placed a "mantle of
protection" over the tortious activities of one partner toward the
other; and the present tendency and the weight of authority is decidedly to hold the negligent driver liable to his passenger." In fact
hinney, ii Iowa 606, 154 N. W. 3io (I915); Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 52
N. E. io68 (i899) (driver was guest of enterprisers); Lucey v. John Hope & Sons
Engraving and Mfg. Co., 45 R. I. 203, 120 Atl. 62 (1923). In the following cases
the inference is that if a joint enterprise existed, the passenger would be liable:
Adamson v. McEwen, 12 Ga. App. 5o8, 77 S. E. 591 (1913); Anthony v. Kiefner,
96 Kan. 194, I5O Pac. 524 (I925); cf. dissent in Langley v. So. Ry., 113 S. C. 45,
ioi S. E. 286 (I919).
"Barnett v. Levy, 213 Ill. App. 129 (I919) (case may mean that some duty of
care exists although different from the duty to one who is a guest); Farthing v.
Hepinstall, supra note 6; Frisorger v. Shepse, 23o N. W. 926 (Mich. 1930); see
Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272, 286, 74 So. 992, 997 (1917). But see Lawrason
v. Richard, 129 So. 250, 256 (La. 2930).
12In the following cases, the courts failed to find a joint enterprise, the inference being that if 'one existed it would be a defence: Lasley v. Crawford, 228 Ill.
App. 590 (1923); Fisher v. Johnson, 238 Ill. App. 25 (2925); Hemington v. Hemington, 222 Mich. 2o6, i9o N. W. 683 (2922); Jessup v. Davis, 15 Neb. 1, 211
N. W. 290 (2926); Bolton v. Wells, 58 N. D. 286, 225 N. W. 791 (2929); Schwartz
v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S. W. 32 (1926); Offer v. Swancoat, 27 S. W. (2d)
899 (Tex. Civ. App. 2930); Landry v. Hubert, 100 Vt. 268, 237 Atl. 97 (2927);
Round v. Pike, 248 Atl. 283 (Vt. I93O). The question is expressly left open in
Loftus v. Pelletier, 223 Mass. 63, Ii N. E. 712 (i926); Hilton v. Blose, 297 Pa.
458, 147 Atl. 100 (1929).
In Connecticut, by statute, a gratuitous guest may not sue the driver. See
Silver v. Silver, 28o U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 (1929).

13Whiddon v. Malone,

22o

Ala.

220, 124

So. 516

(1929);

Bushnell v. Bushnell,

io3 Conn. 583, I32 Atl. 432 (2925); Harber v. Graham, IO5 N. J. L. 213, 143
Atl. 340 (2928); Wilmes v. Fournier, III Misc. 9, 18o N. Y. Supp. 86o (Sup. Ct.
1920), aff'd, 194 App. Div. 950, 185 N. Y. Supp. 958 (4th Dept. 2920), leave to
appeal denied, 195 App. Div. 99, i85 N. Y. Supp. 958 (4th Dept. 1921); Bloom v.
Leech, supra note 6; Bailey v. Parker, 34 Ohio App. 207, 17o N. E. 607 (2930);
O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 292, 270 Pac. 304 (2928); Collins v. Anderson,
37 Wyo. 275, 26o Pac. 1089 (2927); cf. Wren v. Suburban Motor Transfer Co.,
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two courts have suggested that the existence of the relation increases
14
the driver's duty of care to his passenger.
THE SEVERAL CONCEPiTIONS OF A JOINT ENTERPRISF

More important, perhaps, than the consequences flowingfrom the
existence of the joint enterprise, are the elements which, if they appear, will invoke the application of that doctrine, and the situations
which have been held to be both within and outside it. The cases may
be conveniently considered in three groups.
A. The Orthodox View: By the decided weight of authority two
elements must appear in order to constitute a joint enterprise. There
must be both (i) a community of interest in the object of the trip and
(2) a mutual right in the occupants to direct each other in relation to
the management of the vehicle."5 The circumstances must be such
that it can be said that the vehicle is in their common possession."6
Normally it is for the jury to decide whether a joint enterprise exists.'7
Under this conception of a joint enterprise, it is apparent that the
existence of a common purpose is not sufficient to warrant the imputation of negligence. Thus, there is no joint enterprise where it simply
appears that the parties were on a pleasure trip,8 or a hunting or
fishing expedition, 9 or were attending a picnic. 2 Nor is the doctrine
S. W. 464 (1922), and the Louisiana cases cited supra note Ii; see ROWLEY,
PARTNERSHIP (z916) § 758. The effect of the Bushnell decision has been overruled by statute. See supra note 12. It should be noticed that in Michigan,
where Thorogood v. Bryan still obtains, that doctrine is no defence in the hands
of the driver, supra note 5, but the joint enterprise doctrine is. See supra no.e ii.
14The Whiddon and O'Brien cases, both supra note 13.
1
5Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, supra note io; Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., 174
241

Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917); Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. 588, 139 N. E. 298
(1923); Jessup v. Davis, supra note 12; Bloom v. Leech, supra note 6; authorities
cited supra note 7 and infra note 70.
16Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 Pac. 47o (1924); State v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
151 Md. 679, 135 Atl. 827 (1927); Farthing v. Hepinstall, supra note 6.
"Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co., supra note io; Clark v. Mo. Pac.
R. R., 115 Kan. 823, 224 Pac. 920 (1924); Farthing v. Hepinstall, supra note 6;
Hollister v. Hines, I50 Minn. I85, 184 N. W. 856 (1921); Robison v. OregonWashington R. R. & Nav. Co., supra note 6.
' 0 Carter v. Brown, 136 Ark. 23, 206 S. W. 71 (1918); Indianapolis & Cincinnati
Traction Co. v. Thompson, 81 Ind. App. 498, 134 N. E. 514 (1922); Cram v.
City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 1292, 172 N. W. 23 (r919); Pusey v. Atl. Coast
LineR. R., I8I N. C. 137, io6 S. E. 452 (1921); Landry v. Hubert, supranote I2;
cf. Franko v. Vakares, supranote i.
' 0 Bradshaw v. Payne, Iii Kan. 475, 207 Pac. 802 (1922); Kokesh v. Price, 136
Minn. 304, 161 N. W. 715 (1917); Moore v. Almendinger, 32 Ohio C. A. 299
(1921); cf. Wilmes v. Fournier, supranote 13.
2"Wagner v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174, 175 N. W. 84o (1920); Koplitz v. City of St.
Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794 (1902).
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applicable where members of an orchestra accept the invitation of
2
one of their number to ride with him to the place of performance, '
or where the occupants of the vehicle are opposing parties to a commercial transaction riding together in connection therewith. 22 Nor
does the fact that the parties were in the habit of taking such drives
together show a joint enterprise.2Y In all of these instances the driver
has not surrendered his exclusive right to control and hence it cannot
be said that the driver and the passenger had a mutual right to direct
each other in the management of the vehicle.
Attempts to impute the negligence of one member of a common
law relation (other than master and servant, etc.) to his fellow member, simply because of the existence of that relation, have uniformly
failed. Thus the negligence of a parent will not be imputed to his
minor child who is riding with him. 24 Nor will other degrees of family
kinship of themselves warrant the imputation of negligence.2 The
2

'Bailey v. Parker, supra note 13; Round v. Pike, supra note 12 (perhaps case
treats it as jury question whether mutual right of control exists).
22So. Pac. Co. v. Wright, 248 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (demonstration of
truck to prospective buyer, plus rental feature in interim); Wren v. Suburban
Motor Transfer Co., supra note 13 (broker driving prospective purchaser to
inspect house); Bloom v. Leech, supra note 6 (vendor driving prospective purchaser of live stock); Offer v. Swancoat, supra note 12 (purchaser riding with
broker; Ryan v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 146, 211 Pac. 482 (1923) (lessor driving lessee to
premises); cf. Loftus v. Pelletier, supra note 12 (nurse employed by club, riding
with doctor-not imputed); Jessup v. Davis, supra note 12 (bank cashier and
collection agent on way to swear out criminal complaint-not imputed). See
also the following cases where negligence was imputed, in which the relation
of the parties is not made clear: Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Armstrong, 127
Ky. 367, 105 S. W. 473 (1907) (two men carting fodder); Omaha & Republican
Valley Ry. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627, 67 N. W. 599 (1896) (two mechanics returning
from their work); Schron v. Staten Island Elec. R. R., 16 App. Div. ii1, 45 N. Y.
Supp. 124 (2d Dept. z897) (father and son engaged in moving goods).
2
3Ward v. Meeds, ix4 Minn. 517, 13o N. W. 2 (1911); cf. Hollister v. Hines,
supra note 17. See also Fisher v. Johnson, supra note 12; Kessler v. Davis, infra
note 51; Wash. & Old Dominion R. R. v. Zell's Adm'x, infra note 59.
2'Gorman v. Maizer, 149 Atl. 122 (N. J. 7930). Contra: Morningstar v. Northeast Pa. R. R., 290 Pa. 14, 137 Atl. 8o0 (1927); cf. Covington v. Sea Board Air
Line Ry., 128 So. 426 (Fla. 1930). For authorities in support of the general view
See BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supranote 4a, at 1001, 1156; Gilmore, op. cit. supranote 8,
at 2o; Cf. (1927) 5I A. L. R. 209. It seems that in New York the negligence of a
parent will be imputed to a child, non suijuris. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis,
253 N. Y. 423, 171 N. E. 694 (1930); see Jacobs v. Koehler Sporting Goods Co.,
208 N. Y. 416, 418, 102 N. E. 519 (1913).
t2

Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., supranote 15 (father and son); Anthony v. Kiefner,
supranote Io (mother and son); Hollister v. Hines, supra note 77 (sisters); (1924)
xx BrT. Rut. CAs. 597, 617.
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negligence of a husband will not be imputed to his wife,2" even though
there be the common object of pleasure,2 7buying groceries, 28 taking
the children for a ride,29 or changing their place of abode.30 But the
existence of these family relations will not prevent the application of
the joint enterprise doctrine where the necessary elements are present.3 In other words, in deciding whether or not a joint enterprise
exists, the kinship of the occupants of the vehicle is of no consequence.
In a few jurisdictions a spouse's recovery for personal injuries is
community property. Where such is the law, the contributory negligence of one mate will be imputed to the other in an"action against
a negligent third party, not on the theory of a joint enterprise, but
rather on the ground that a recovery in favor of the injured spouse
would permit her mate to profit from his own wrong. 2 The policy
here is the same one which, before the married woman's enabling
acts, had been held by some courts to prevent recovery by the wife
where the negligence of her husband contributed to her injury.
These cases are outside of the joint enterprise doctrine; they rest on
the property law, and not the tort law of those jurisdictions.
Although, of course, the negligence of a servant is imputed to his
2'So. Ry. v. Priester, 289 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Stevens v. Luther,
IO5 Neb. 184, i8o N. W. 87 (1920); Lucey v. Allen, 44 R. I. 379, 117 Atl. 539
(1922); BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4a, at 1152; (1924) ii BAIT. RuL. CAS.
597, 6x3.
2
7Bowley v. Duca, 8o N. H. 548, 12o Atl. 74 (1923); Alperdt v. Paige, supra
note i; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 91 S. E. 632 (1917).
28Bowley v. Duca, supra note 27.
2
"Fuller v. Mills, 36 Ga. App. 357, 136 S. E. 807 (1927); Bowley v. Duca, supa

note 27.
38Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N. W. 69o (1921).
"Crawford v. McElhinney, supra note io (husband and wife); Farthing v.
Hepinstall, supra note 6 (brother and sister); Tannehill v. Kansas City, etc.
Ry., 279 Mo. 158, 213 S. W. 818 (I919) (brothers); Perrin v. Wells, 22 S. W.
(2d) 863 (Mo. App. 1930) (husband and wife); Schron v. Staten Island Elec.
R. R., supra note 22 (father and son).
32
Pac. Const. Co. v. Cochran, 29 Ariz. 554, 243 Pac. 4o5 (1926) (not an automobile case); Dunbar v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 54 Cal. App.
15, 201 Pac. 330 (1921); Rapolla v. Goulart, 287 Pac. 562 (Cal. I93O); N. Texas
Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S. W. 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Ostheller v. Spokane &
Inland Empire R. R., 107 Wash. 678,182 Pac. 63o (I919). In Louisiana, the recovery of a wife for personal injuries is not community property, LA. REv. Civ.
CODE (Merrick's 3d ed. 1925) art..2402, and there her husband's negligence will
not be attributed to her. Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 7 La. App. 653 (1928).
33
Pa. R. R. v. Goodenough, 55 N. J. L. 577, 28 Atl. 3 (1893); BLACK, LAW AND
PRACTxcE iN ACCIDENT CASES (1900) § 337. The New Jersey case is no longer
law in that state. Peskowitz v. Lawrence F. Kramer, Inc., Io5 N. J. L. 415,
z44 Atl. 6o4 (1928). See also discussion in (1929) 59 A. L. R. 153.
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master, that relation does not warrant the imputing of the negligence
of the master to the servant who is riding with him., 4 And by the
great weight of authority fellow servants, whether public or private,
do not bear the consequences of each other's negligence. 5 However,
where both employees were charged with the duty of driving, a joint
enterprise was found; 6 and the negligence of one employee has been
imputed to his co-employee who was acquainting him with a milk
route, because of the instructor's equal, if not superior right of control. 37

On the other hand, it has been held that a deputy fire chief

was not responsible for the negligence of his chauffeur, even though,
apparently, the deputy chief had the right of control. 8
In most of the cases where a litigant has sought to rely on the joint
enterprise doctrine the attempts have failed because, although a common purpose existed, the element of a mutual right of control was
34
Peterson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 142 La. 835, 77 So. 647 (i918);
Robertson v. United Fuel & Supply Co., supra note 5; Sylvester v. St. Paul City
Ry., I53 Minn. 516, 191 N. W. 46 (1922); Shipley v. Reid Ice Cream Corp., 8
N. J. Misc. 849, 152 Atl. 183 (193o); Anastasio v. Hedges, 207 App. Div. 406,

202 N. Y. Supp. io9 (Ist Dept. 1923) (not an automobile case); Hines v. Welch,
supra note 6; Neagle v. City of Tacoma, 127 Wash. 528, 221 Pac. 588 (1923); cf.
Loftus v. Pelletier, supranote 12; Dunlap v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., infra note

55. But see the unfortunate case of Lundergan v. N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River
R. R., 203 Mass. 460, 89 N. E. 625 (19o9), where it was held that a servant could
not recover against a third party where the servant, at the master's direction,
assisted in looking for an approaching train, even though the accident resulted entirely from the concurring negligences of the master and third party.
3
Public employees: Charleston & W. Carolina R. R. v. Alwang, 258 Fed. 297
(C. C.A. 4th, 1919) (soldiers); Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Baker, 132 Ala. 507,
31 So. 618 (1902) (firemen); Hogan v. Fleming, 218 Mo. App. 172, 265 S. W. 875
(1924) (policemen). Private employees: Sichterman v. Hollingshead Co., 94 Cal.
App. 486,271 Pac. 372, 1111 (1928); Mattes v. Brugner, 88 Ind. App. 36, 159 N.E.
156 (1927); McCormack v. Nassau Elec. R. R.; I6 App. Div. 24, 44 N.Y. Supp.
684 (2d Dept. 1897); Williams v. Atl. Coast Line R. R., 19o N. C. 366, 129 S. B.
816 (1925). - See cases collected in BLASHvIELD, Op. Cit. supra note 4a, at 1145;
HUDDY, op. cit supra note 4a, at § 684; (1907) 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 597, 632-4. In
some of these cases the courts refer to the joint enterprise doctrine, while in the
others the courts simply speak in terms of imputed negligence.
8uCrescent Motor Co. v. Stone, supranote IO. Accord: Ala. Great So. R. R. v.
Hanbury, I6i Ala. 358, 49 So. 467 (1909) (probably influenced by statute covering
particular facts).
37
Kirkland v. Atchison, etc. Ry., 104 Kan. 388, 179 Pac. 362 (1919). Accord:
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Warnock's Adm'x, 232 Ky. 340, 23 S. W. (2d) 558 (193o).
3
Shuster v. McDermit, 104 N. J. L. 58, 14o Atl. 421 (1928). In some of the
cases cited supra note 35, the courts point out that the passenger-servant has no
authority over the driver. It is doubtful, however, that these courts, if confronted squarely with the problem, would adopt the inference from their decisions and impute the negligence of the driver to a fellow servant with superior
authority.
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lacking. To bring a case within the doctrine, it is not-necessary to
show that the occupant was in actual control of the vehicle, so long
as there exists the right to control;39 that is, it need not appear that
the occupant exercised his right to control and in any way contributed
to the injury. Indeed, if actual control is shown, the passenger would
probably be independently negligent. On the other hand, actual
control by the passenger over the places to be visited or the route
to be taken is not enough to show a mutual right of control.40 Nor
does the fact that the passenger requested the driver to undertake
the trip establish a joint enterprise,4' although in Pennsylvania it was
strangely held that, where the passenger requested his friend, the
owner of the car, to drive him to a certain point as a friendly courtesy,
the driver was the agent in fact of the passenger.4
The necessary mutual right of control is established upon proof
that the occupants are joint owners 4 or joint bailees4 of the vehicle.
39Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone; Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co., both
supra note IO. There are some cases in which joint control in fact was treated
as the equivalent of a joint right of control. This was true in Langley v. So. Ry.,
supra note IO,where all occupants concurred in a desire to beat the train at the
crossing. So, toi, in Franko v. Vakares, supra note i, where a group of men
went off on a drinking party, the court said that, since in fact a common will prevailed, the joint enterprise doctrine might be applied. In Kinnie v. Town of
Morristown, 184 App. Div. 408, 172 N. Y. Supp. 21 (3d Dept. 1918), on facts
identical with the Franco case, the same result is reached, but the theory is not
made clear. These cases are unquestionably justifiable on the grounds of the
passenger's independent negligence, but it is misleading to use the joint enterprise
doctrine, for on the theory of independent negligence a causal connection must be
shown between the act of the passenger and the injury, but on the joint enterprise doctrine there need be no connection between the right to control and the
damage
done. On a proper set of facts, this difference would be decisive.
40
So. Pac. Co. v. Wright, supra note 22; Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., supranote 15;
Cram v. City of Des Moines, supra note 18; Anthony v. Kiefner, supra note io;
Bloom v. Leech, supra note 6.
41
SO. Pac. Co. v. Wright, supra note 22; DeSoto v. Pac. Elec. Ry., 49 Cal.
App. 285, 193 Pac. 270 (1920); Tronto v. Reo Motor Co., 92 N. J. L. 595, io6 Atl.
383 (1919).

42Hepps v. Bessemer & L. E. R. R., 284 Pa. 479, I3I Atl. 279 (1925); Cf. Schofield
v. Director General, 276 Pa. 5o8, 12o Atl. 449 (1923). For a discussion of the
elements constituting the master-servant relation, see (1925) 11 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 104.
0

Wiley v. Dobbins, 204 Iowa 174, 214 N. W. 529 (1927); Tannehill v. Kansas
City, etc. Ry.; Perrin v. Wells, both supra note 3I; Clark v. Town of Hampton,
83 N. H. 524, 145 Atl. 265 (1929); Cf. Carero v. Breslin, 3 N. J. Misc. 507, 128 Atl.
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(1925).

Farthing v. Hepinstall, supra note 6; Lucey v. John Hope & Sons Engraving
and Mfg. Co., supra note IO; cf. Hollister v. Hines, supra note i7; Hurley v. City
of Spokane, infra note 61. See also the joint hiring cases, infra note 47.
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Thus, where a parent loaned her car to her children so that they
might attend a church fair, it was held that there was a joint enterprise if the vehicle was intrusted to all of the children, but not if it
were intrusted to the exclusive custody of the one who drove, for
in that event there would be lacking the element of mutual right of
control.45 In this connection it might be noted again that where the
doctrine of community property exists the husband's negligence is
imputed to the wife, not on the theory that their joint interest in the
vehicle gives each an equal right of management, but rather on the
4
ground that a recovery would benefit the negligent spouse. 1
Where a group of persons hire a vehicle to be driven by one of their
number, it seems clear that a mutual right of control exists,

47

although

the amount of litigation in this common situation is surprisingly
small. And where three salesmen agreed to share all expenses (including the items of wear and tear) of operating a car owned and
driven by one of them, it was held as a matter of law that the relation
was the same as if they had jointly hired the car.48 But normally it
is a question for the jury whether the driver has, by virtue of the
agreement to share expenses and the other circumstances, relinquished his exclusive right of control.4 9 Nevertheless it has been
held as a matter of law that there was no joint enterprise where the
arrangements for a picnic imposed upon the women the expense of
supplying food, and the men the expense of supplying transportation;50 and likewise, where there was a scheme of mutual accommodation whereby two neighbors drove to work together, alternating
45

Farthing v. Hepinstall, supranote 6.

46Supra note 32.
47Christopherson v. Minneapolis, etc. Ry., 28 N. D. 128, I47 N. W. 791 (1914);
Dixon v. Grand Trunk Ry., 47 Ont. L. R. 15, 5z Dom. L. R. 576 (1920); see
Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 530, 124 Atl. 224, 225 (1924).
48Derrick v. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry., 50 Utah 573, 168 Pac. 335 (1917). Accord:
Frisorger v. Shepse, supra note i i.
49
Coleman v. Bent, supra note 47; Barnett v. Levy, supra note II; Adams v.
Swift, supra note ro; Beaucage v. Mercer, 2o6 Mass. 492, 92 N. E. 774 (1910); cf.
Jenson v. Chicago, etc. Ry., infra note 62, and Offer v. Swancoat, supra note 12,
where the court says that such evidence could not sustain a finding of joint
control.
SoKoplitz v. City of St. Paul, supra note 2o. This case might have been rested
on the fact that the parties contemplated being .passengers for hire, since an
omnibus and driver were hired, one of the party later taking control without the
knowledge of the others. See also Adamson v. McEwen, supranote IO,where it
was held that an agreement by the passenger to pay hotel expenses at the end of
the trip did not affect his status as a guest.
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in the use of their cars, but each driving and maintaining the expenses
of his own.51
B. The Common Purpose Test: The second class of cases ignores
the element of mutual right of control and looks merely for a common
purpose. Some of the earlier cases in this group, rather than imputing the negligence of the driver to the passenger in so many words,
merely held both to an equal duty of care. In the usual situation the
difference is more one of expression than of result, for no appreciable effort is made to determine whether the circumstances of the
case would have permitted a successful exercise of that duty by the
passenger, or whether the attempt to exercise it, if an attempt was
actually made, was a reasonable one under the facts of the case. In
short, the substantial effect of imposing that duty upon the passenger
has been to fasten the driver's negligence upon him. This modified
terminology was used where two friends were riding together to see
points of mutual interest ;12 where four men were returning from a
ball game;" where fellow servants were riding together in the course
of their employment;" where a deputy sheriff was the passenger of
his superior;5 where two employees were travelling together to collect their wages. 6
The common purpose test of a joint enterprise, expressed in terms
of imputed negligence rather than in the language of equal duty of
care, was applied to a husband and wife on a fishing excursion;57 to
boys in a rowboat, apparently for pleasure; 8 to two friends who frequently made pleasure trips together in a car owned by one of them
and who were on such a trip at the time of the accident; 9 to two men
6Fisher v. Johnson, supranote 12; cf. Kessler v. Davis, iii Kan. 515, 207 Pac.
799 (1922), where on similar facts it was held to have been proper to submit the
case to the jury which found that there was no joint enterprise.
62Davis v. Chicago, etc. Ry., I59 Fed. Io (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
OMartin v. Pa. R. R., 265 Pa. 282, io8 Atl. 635 (1919).
&Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. R., 278 Pa. 246, 522 Atl. 274 (1923); cf. Siever
v. Pittsburgh, etc. Ry., 252 Pa. I, 97 Atl. 16 (1916) (unsuccessful effort to

impute the passenger's negligence to the driver); Kelly v. Northampton Co. Ag.
SoC., 286 Pa. 97, 132 Atl. 832 (1926).
55

Dunlap v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 248 Pa. 130, 93 Atl. 873 (1915); cf.

Laudenberger v. Easton Transit Co., 26i Pa. 288, 104 Atl. 588 (5958) (precise relation of parties not clear).
6Gersman v. Atcheson, etc. Ry., 229 S. W. 167 (Mo. 1921).
57Del. & Hudson C. v. Boyden, 269 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) (apparently
applying Pennsylvania law).
58
Beck v. East River Ferry C., 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 82 (1868); cf. Schron v.

Staten
Island Elec. R. R., supra note 22.
59
0 Wash. and Old Dominion R. R. v. Zell's Adm'x, 118 Va. 755, 88 S. E. 3o9
(1916). Although the court refers to the prior trips made by the parties, the basis
seems to be the common purpose.
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taking young ladies for a ride ;60 to a brother and sister going to church
in their father's car;1 to a group of men on their way to witness a prize
fight;62 to participants in a scheme to rescue a prisoner;1' to friends
who were bringing home their winter supply of potatoes;" to a prospective-purchaser riding with a piano salesman;, to fellow servants
riding together in the course of their employment.66
Several courts have pointed out the danger inherent in so sweeping
a conception of a joint enterprise. 7 To quote from an opinion of the
California court:
"Such a case is Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury (Vt.), 96
Atl. 334, where apparently the only basis for the imputation of
the negligence of the driver of the automobile to the plaintiff was
the circumstance that they were both engaged in the common
purpose of taking two ladies for an afternoon's drive to view a
lake.
"In our opinion, the doctrine of imputable negligence should not
be so loosely applied. To do so leaves the law in an uncertain
state... "68

The best commentary upon the extravagant consequences of the
common purpose test is a recent Pennsylvania case where the court
imputed the negligence of a master to a servant whom the master
was driving to work as part of the consideration of employment.69 If
this conception were faithfully applied, a joint enterprise would be
found in most of the cases which have involved the rights of a pas60Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60, 96 Atl. 334 (IgI6).
61
Hurley
62

v. City of Spokane, 126 Wash. 213, 217 Pac. 1004 (1923).
Jensen v. Chicago, etc. Ry., 133 Wash. 2o8, 233 Pac. 635 (z925). The court
points out that there was an agreement to share expenses but, since the court expressly denies the need for a mutual right to control, this agreement cannot be the
basis of the decision.
OVa. Ry. v. Underwood, 752 Va. 264, 746 S. E. 277 (7929).
"Hanser v. Youngs, 212 Mich. 5o8, i8o N. W. 409 (1920).
85
Lawrence v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R., 52 Utah 414, 174 Pac. 817 (i978).
6Otis v. Kolsky, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 548 (1928); Martin v. Puget Sound Elec.
Ry., 136 Wash. 663, 241 Pac. 360 (7925); cf. Griffiths v. Lehigh Valley Transit
Co., 292 Pa. 489, 141 Atl. 300 (1928) (salesmen; not clear whether employed
by6the same company; imputed).
Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., supra note 15; Pope v. Halpern, supra note 16Coleman v. Bent, supra note 47.
6
Bryant v. Pac. Elec. Ry., supranote 75, at 742, 764 Pac. at 387.
6

'Campagna v. Lyles, 293 Pa. 352, 148 Atl. 527 (1929). This case is adversely
criticized in (930) 30 COL. L. REv. 58i. The Pennsylvania decisions will support

almost any conception of the nature and consequences of the joint enterprise
doctrine.

On the proposition that the ride was part of the servant's compensation, see an
earlier case arising from the same facts: Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403, 1135
Atl. 124 (1926).
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senger. To reduce it to the absurd, two boys on a bicycle, wending
their way to the neighborhood candy store, would be engaged in a
joint enterprise.
These decisions seem to have arisen from a misunderstanding of
the true joint enterprise doctrine. This is evidenced by the fact that
in practically all of the jurisdictions where the common purpose test
has been applied there are other decisions requiring both a common
purpose and an equal right of control.70 Hence it cannot safely be
said that any one jurisdiction adheres definitely to the common purpose test. In all probability the above decisions will be explained
away as sporadic misapplications of the joint enterprise doctrine.
C. A Third Conception: There are a few cases constituting another
variation from the orthodox conception of a joint enterprise, which
are of comparatively little consequence but nevertheless worthy of
mention. In these cases, although there is a common object, the element of a mutual right of control is lacking, and instead there eiists
the actual control on the part of the driver and the right of control
on the part of the passenger, either as owner,7' bailee,72 or co-employee
of superior authority.73 Since in these cases only the rights of the
passenger were involved, the imputation of negligence was perhaps
justifiable on the ground of an agency in fact or a superior right of
control. But the theory of joint enterprise is objectionable here, because it inferentially suggests that the negligence of the passenger
would be imputed to the driver, and further, that, if the position of
the occupants were reversed, the negligence of the owner-driver would
be imputable to his passenger. It is unlikely that any such conclusions are intended by these decisions.
70
Farthing v. Hepinstall, supranote 6; Perrin v. Wells; supranote 31; Wilmes v.
Fournier, supra note I3 (inferentially); Alperdt v. Paige, supra note i; Hilton
v. Blose, supra note 12; Derrick v. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry., supranote 48; Landry v. Hubert, supra note 12; Director General v. Pence's Adm'x, supra note 6;
Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57, 28o Pac. 932 (1929).
71
Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co.; Crawford v. McElhinney, both
supra note IO. This theory may be the basis of Va. Ry. v. Underwood, supra note
63. Compare Franko v. Vakares and Langley v. So. Ry., discussed supranote 39.
72
Masterson v. Leonard, 116 Wash. 551, 200 Pac. 320 (1921). A joint enterprise was here found to exist as a matter of law where the bailee of a bicycle was
riding on the frame of the bicycle, propelled by a friend, the common object
being to acquaint the friend with a newspaper route. In Sharkey v. Herman
Bros., 3 N.J. Misc. 126, 127 Atl. 525 (1925), aff'd, 102 N.J. L. 224, 13o Atl. 920
(1925), under almost identical facts, the question was held to have been properly
submitted to a jury which found that no joint enterprise existed.
73
Kirkland v. Atchison, etc. Ry., supra note 37.
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ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE JOINT ENTERPRISE
DOCTRINE

Although the joint enterprise doctrine has been either invoked or
approved in about three-fourths of the American jurisdictions and repudiated in none, there is a remarkable dearth of discussion as to the
policy behind the orthodox statement of the rule or as to why the
doctrine should exist in any form at all. It will be noticed from the
above discussion that the cardinal emphasis in the orthodox statement
of the joint enterprise doctrine is upon the mutual right of control.
It is true that the rule requires in addition that there be a common
purpose, but in the usual situation that element is easily found. It
is the control feature which, when it comes to applying the doctrine,
.is the turning point in the solution of the case.
,'Why the emphasis on the right of control? In view of the conditions of modem transportation it must be a rare mishap which the
passenger in a joint enterprise could have averted by the exercise of
his much-referred-to right of control.

If anything, his intervention

would add peril to the situation. The judicial observations upon the
iniquities of the "back-seat driving" of a guest7 4 are no less apt because the passenger interferes as a matter of right. What is even
more significant is that the courts do not inquire as to whether the
passenger could have avoided the accident by the exercise of his right
of control. The cases, in passing upon the liability of the passenger,
consider only the conduct of the driver. They do not speak in terms
of the passenger's duty and breach of duty, but rather in terms of his
75
right of control and imputed negligence. If, then, the right of control
bears no causal relation to the injury, why do the courts look for so
impotent a right and make it the test of liability?
The writer hazards the following answer. The control feature
seems to have been borrowed from the cases dealing with the liability
of a master for the negligence of his servant. It is often said that a
master is liable for the torts of his servant because the master has the
76
right to control the actions of those whom he employs. This, how7

USee So. Pac. Co. v. Wright, supra note 22, at 264; Chambers v. Hawkins, 233
Ky. 211, 214, 25 S. W. (2d) 363, 364 (1930); Kilpatrick v. Phila. Rapid Transit,

290 Pa. 288, 298, 138 Atl. 830, 834 (1927); Brubaker v. Iowa County, supra note
3o, at 58o, 183 N. W. at 693.
7An inconsistent suggestion appears in Beck v. East River Ferry Co., supra
note 58, where it is intimated that the passenger would be excused if it appeared
that he did all in his power to overcome the negligence of his associate.
7
6Little v. Hackett, supra note 4, at 376, 6 Sup. Ct. at 395; Bennett v. N. J.
R. R. & Trans. Co., supra note 3, at 227; Gilmore, op. cit supra note 8. at 194;
(1924) ii BRIT. RUL. CAS. 597, 629.
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ever, cannot be the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior, for if
it were, it would excuse the master who was not present at the time
of his servant's culpable conduct and could not therefore control
it. Indeed, no court, in holding the master responsible for the negligence of his servant, stops to consider whether the master, by the
exercise of his right of control, could have averted the injury. In the
final analysis, the reason for the rule of respondeat superior must be
some public policy in favor of burdening one who acts through another
in pursuit of his own ends with the injuries incidental to his servant's
activities.7 7 The right of control is simply one of the tests whereby
the courts determine whether the relation of master and servant
exists; the liability attaching to that relation arises from considerations entirely foreign to the right of control.
It would seem to be an obvious fallacy to carry what is simply the
test of the existence of the master-servant relation into a field where
that relation admittedly does not exist and there use it as a test of
liability. Yet this is precisely what has happened. In rejecting the
early attempts to impute the negligence of a driver to his passenger,
as for example in rejecting the Thorogood case, the courts quite uniformly pointed out that the passenger did not have the right to control the driver.78 What those courts unquestionably meant was that,
applying the test of the existence of the master-servant relation, the
result was that the relation could not be found. The manner of stating that observation, however, left an inference that if a right of control did exist, then, even in the absence of the master-servant relation,
the negligence of the driver would be imputable to his passenger.
This inference, by force of repetition, finally crystallized into a conception in the law, for which there is now considerable authority,
that where there is a right of control in the occupant, then, without
9
proof of more, the negligence of the driver will be fastened upon him7
"7For discussions of the basis of the master's liability, see MECHEM, LAW OF
ed. 1914) § 1856; POLLOCK, TORTS (I3th ed. 1929) 80; I SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at § I42.
AGENCY (2d
7

SSee United States, Massachusetts, and New Jersey cases supra note 4.
"See, for example, cases cited supra note 37, which hold that the negligence of
the driver will be imputed to his fellow servant who has a right of control.
The issue whether a right of control of itself warrants the imputation of
negligence is squarely raised where the passenger is the owner or his bailee and the
driver is not the agent of such owner or bailee. The following cases, in the writer's
opinion, impute the negligence of the driver to the passenger under those facts:
Atcheson, etc. Ry. v. McNulty, 285 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), certiorari
denied, 262 U. S. 746, 43 Sup. Ct. 521 (1923); Baker v. Maseeh, 2o Ariz. 201, 179
Pac. 53 (igi9); Wis. & Ark. Lumber Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 248 S. W. 278
(1923); McKerall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 257 S. W. 166 (Mo. App.
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It was therefore natural enough, although equally unfortunate, that
when the joint enterprise doctrine was formulated, the right of control feature was given a conspicuous role.
If we thus remove the magic from the nebulous right of control, it
becomes difficult to understand why the juristic result should depend
on whether both or only one of co-employees are charged with the duty
of driving; on whether a parent entrusts his car to all or to only one
of his children; or on whether, when a group of men agree to share
expenses of operating a car owned by the driver, the driver has relinquished his exclusive right of control. In all of these situations the
test must logically be, as in the analogous case of master and servant,
whether, when there is an association for a common object, it is sound
policy to apply the fictional doctrine of vicarious responsibility. It
is immediately apparent that so broad a criterion is fraught with
danger. In fact this test is none other than the common purpose
test which, as we have already seen, has actually been utilized in some
of the joint enterprise cases but which is condemned as unwholesomely wide in its application.
Furthermore, if the common object test is sound, there is no reason
why the joint enterprise doctrine should be limited to cases where the
fellow enterpriser is present in the vehicle. Granted the necessary
1923); Roland v. Anderson, 282 S. W. 752 (Mo. App. 1926); Robison v. OregonWashington R. R. & Nay. Co., supra note 6; Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204, 104 Atl.
587 (1918); cf. Watkins v. Brown, 14 Ga. App. 99, 8o S. E. 212 (1913); Chambers
v. Hawkins, 233 Ky. 211, 25 S. W. (2d) 363 (1930); Kelly v. Thibodeau, 120 Me.
402, 115 Atl. 162 (192I); Lucey v. Allen, supranote 26.
In Zeeb v. Bahnmaier, 1o3 Kan. 599, 602, 176 Pac. 326, 327 (1918), rehearing
denied, 103 Kan. 895, 176 Pac. 643 (i918), the court refused to follow the above
decisions, saying: "Why should the mere presence of the owner of the automobile,
which was in the possession, control and exclusive management of another
responsible adult at the time of the tort, subject the owner of the car to liability in
damages? An automobile is a more safe and dependable chattel than a horse,
and it is not an inherently dangerous instrument-certainly much less so than a
shotgun." In accord with the proposition of this case that an owner may have the
status of a guest in his own car are: Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 13o N. W.
336 (1911); Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, II6 N. E. 78 (1917); Va. Ry. & Power
Co. v. Gorsuch, supra note 27; Reiter v. Grober, supra note 4; Pratt v. Patrick,
[1924] I K. B. 488; cf. So. Ry. v. Priester, supranote 26. The line of demarcation
suggested by the Pratt case is whether or not a technical bailment can be found.
For a somewhat different analysis of the cases on this point, see (I919) 2 A.
L. R. 888.
Compare also, Van Sciver v. Abbott's Alderney Dairies, 6 N. J. Misc. 949, 143
Atl. 153 (1928) and Round v. Pike, supra note 12, where it was held that the
negligence of a driver who was operating under a permit was not imputable
to a licensed driver seated beside him in order to comply with the statutory requirement.
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common purpose, the enterpriser who stays at home should be compelled to respond to innocent third parties injured by the negligent
driver, and if the absent enterpriser has a property interest which has
been invaded by the concurring negligence of the driver and third
party, he should be without remedy against the third party,"' and
perhaps also against the driver.
We should go even further. Why limit the doctrine to the use of a
vehicle? If it is sound, the negligence of one enterpriser in doing any
act in furtherance of a common undertaking should also be imputed
to his fellow enterpriser. Suppose, for example, that two boys decide
to go 6n a drinking party. In furtherance of their object, one of them
goes to a drug store to purchase the stimulant. The druggist is negligent
in leaving an incompetent lad in charge. Thepurchaser too is negligent
in that the incompetency of the clerk is evident. The liquid sold is
poisonous, and the other party to the enterprise, ignorant of the circumstances of the purchase, drinks it and succumbs. In an action for
wrongful death, will the contributory negligence of the purchaser be
imputed to the deceased so as to absolve the negligent druggist?
Such were the facts in Culli-nan v. Tetrault.81 In this case, the
Maine court, relying upon the joint enterprise cases in the automobile
field, denied recovery. This case is the redutio ad absurdum of the
joint enterprise doctrine.
The application of a doctrine of imputed negligence to the true
master and servant, agency, and partnership relations seems reasonable, for usually such relations are connected with a commercial
venture and the business man may well be deemed to calculate this
risk with the expenses of his activities and perhaps insure against it.
At any rate we are accustomed to it in those situations. But when
the doctrine is extended beyond such associations for profit to what
are usually matters of friendly accommodation, it is out of harmony
with the expectations of the average man. In such cases, a doctrine
which relieves a negligent third party and perhaps the negligent
driver too, and not only denies relief to the innocent passenger, but
"°The writer is not aware of any case making the suggested extension. Generally, the negligence of a bailee will not be imputed to the bailor. (1923) 8 CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY 284. It is likewise held that the negligence of a conditional

vendee is not imputable to the vendor. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 15o Atl. 235 (N. J. 1930). See criticism, (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 135.
123 Me. 302, 122 Atl. 770 (1923).
"'A few cases perhaps require a joint financial interest in the joint enterprise.
Fisher v. Johnson; Jessup v. Davis, both supra note i2; Robison v. OregonWashington R. R. & Nav. Co., supra note 6; Brubaker v. Iowa County, supra
note 3o. But this requirement is not usually made.
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also imposes an affirmative liability upon him, comes as a gratuity
to the beneficiaries of the doctrine and as a distinct shock to the defeated passenger and his attorney as well. Perhaps there are borderline cases which come so close to the true agency relation that some
such doctrine seems just as applied to them, but they do not warrant
the existence of so dangerous a conception. Moreover, as a practical
matter, it is the driver of the vehicle, rather than the passenger, who
is likely to be insured against loss, so that to hold that only the negligent parties are affected by their own conduct would be more consistent with the current philosophy in favor of spreading those losses
which, in a complicated society, are well-nigh inevitable. The joint
enterprise doctrine, the mischievous limits of which are as yet undefined, may well go the way of its predecessor, the doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan.

